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ABSTRACT
Probability ratio and likelihood ratio measures of inductive support and related notions
have appeared as theoretical tools for probabilistic approaches in the philosophy of
science, the psychology of reasoning, and artificial intelligence. In an effort of conceptual
clarification, several authors have pursued axiomatic foundations for these two families
of measures. Such results have been criticized, however, as relying on unduly demanding
or poorly motivated mathematical assumptions. We provide two novel theorems
showing that probability ratio and likelihood ratio measures can be axiomatized in
a way that overcomes these difficulties.
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1 Introduction
In what follows, we will denote the quantity below as the probability ratio:
PðhjeÞ
PðhÞ
To ensure mathematical definiteness, we will assume throughout that h and e
are contingent statements and P is a regular probability function (so that
0<P(h), P(e)< 1).
From Keynes ([1921], pp. 165ff) to Kuipers ([2000], pp. 49ff), the probabil-
ity ratio, or strictly increasing functions of it, have often been said to measure
the degree of inductive support or confirmation that evidence e provides to
hypothesis h. Similarly, the probability ratio has been employed to character-
ize the strength of inductive arguments in the psychological study of human
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